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Abstract
Sarah A. Roache and Lawrence O. Gostin’s recent editorial comprehensively presents soda taxation rationales 
from a public health perspective. While we essentially agree that soda taxes are gaining momentum, this 
commentary expands upon the need for a better understanding of the policy processes underlying their 
development and implementation. Indeed, the umbrella concept of soda taxation actually covers a diversity of 
objectives and mechanisms, which may not only condition the feasibility and acceptability of a proposal, but also 
alter its impact. We briefly highlight some conditions that may have influenced soda tax policy processes and 
why further theory-driven case studies may be instructive. 
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Introduction
Sarah A. Roache and Lawrence O. Gostin’s recent editorial 
highlights various soda taxation logics from a public 
health standpoint, including a price-induced consumption 
disincentive, the generation of revenues to be earmarked 
for health promotion initiatives, and the stimulation of 
product reformulation by the industry.1 As it has been argued 
elsewhere,2 we essentially agree with the authors about the 
importance to tackle sugar-sweetened beverage consumption 
and the fact that soda taxation could be part of a portfolio 
of nutrition-enhancing policies aimed at preventing chronic 
diseases. We also agree about the importance to carefully 
consider potential concerns, eg, increasing socioeconomic 
inequalities, harmful substitution, and appropriate use of 
revenues. Despite promising results in several jurisdictions 
(eg, Berkeley [CA] and Mexico),3,4 the editorial righty calls for 
evaluation efforts in order to assess the impact of soda taxes.1 
In this commentary, we would like to expand this imperative 
upon the need for a better understanding of the policy 
processes underlying the development and implementation 
of such policies. 
Behind the Scenes, the Importance of Policy Processes 
Indeed, despite the “global momentum for soda taxes” 
described by Roache and Gostin,1 this type of intervention 
remains controversial.5 While soda taxes have been enacted 
or announced in more than 20 jurisdictions across the world,2 
debates keep going in many others eg, in Australia,6 New 
Zealand,6 Canada,7 Columbia8 or the Philippines.9 Therefore, 
understanding what conditions favor or preclude the 
elaboration of soda taxes remains of interest. Furthermore, 
the umbrella concept of soda taxation can actually take 
many shapes, be this in terms of tax objectives (focused 
on consumption, revenue generation and/or incentive for 
reformulation), tax type (eg, excise or at the point of purchase), 
tax rate (from 2% to more than 30%), tax scope (eg, including 
or not non-caloric sweetened beverages), tax base (eg, flat rate 
or indexed on the sugar content), tax scale (eg, local, state or 
national) and use of tax revenue (eg, earmarked or not).2,10 
These considerations and parameters may not only condition 
the feasibility and acceptability of a soda tax proposal, but 
it may also influence its impact. This makes the analysis of 
soda tax policy processes all the more relevant. For example, 
considering that the forthcoming UK soda tax indexed on 
sugar content has already encouraged manufacturers to 
reformulate beverages (which was the primary objective 
stated by the government),11 Roache and Gostin rightly 
highlight that understanding the circumstances having led 
to such a tax could be valuable for other jurisdictions. They 
underline key conditions that may have facilitated the policy 
process, including the step-by-step approach adopted by the 
government and the flexibility of the graduated tax scheme 
for manufacturers.1 In sum, although less efforts have been 
dedicated to study soda tax policy processes than soda tax 
potential and actual impacts,2 research on the former can 
complement research on the latter, as further illustrated in the 
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next section.
Conditions Influencing the Prospect for Health-Related 
Food Taxes
Some publications, heterogeneous in purpose, methods 
and format, bring insights into the conditions that may 
have favored the adoption of health-related food taxes. 
To briefly name a few, the high prevalence of obesity and 
non-communicable diseases as well as the recognition of 
pervasive consumption of sugary, salty and fatty foods in 
the population may be a precondition to put a tax on the 
agenda, as described in Mexico12 and Pacific countries.13 
Additionally, the prospect for health-related food taxes 
often appears to be related to budgetary considerations, not 
least because finance authorities generally administer such 
policies. Therefore, the degree of cooperation between public 
health and finance policy-makers may actually be critical to 
make soda taxation feasible and palatable, as shown in Pacific 
countries,14 Mexico,12 Barbados,15 Colorado,16 Philadelphia17 
or the Cook County in Illinois.18 In these last two cases, public 
health motives were even minimized in order to highlight the 
budgetary rationale of the tax, whose revenue was earmarked 
respectively for education and public employment purposes. 
A budgetary rationale has also predominated in France in 
201119 and in Belgium in 2015,20 where low excise (less than 
0.1 €/litre) and large-scope soda taxes (including non-caloric 
sweetened beverages) have been adopted as part of large 
tax reforms. This may have facilitated tax enactment in the 
short-term, but effects on behaviours may be questioned 
since higher tax rates focused on caloric sweetened drinks are 
generally recommended to reduce sugar consumption.21 In 
contrast, if the tax explicitly aims to raise soda prices and curb 
consumption, then pro-taxation advocacy efforts financially 
supported by philanthropic organisations may be essential to 
face resistance among the population, politicians and other 
stakeholders. Such efforts likely contributed to the adoption 
of a tax in Mexico (2013), the city of Berkeley (2014), and 
several other US jurisdictions (2016).18,22 The analysis 
and dissemination of evidence by public health experts 
and scientific organisations may also help and stimulate 
the debate.12,17 Without sufficient mobilisation to counter 
opposition, the prospect may be reduced, as described in the 
Californian city of Richmond (2012)18 or in Hawai’i.23 Finally 
yet importantly, whatever the tax justification, political 
leadership may be decisive, eg, in the way that Mexican 
senators have supported the price-oriented tax proposals 
along the legislative processes in 2012-2013,12 in the way the 
UK chancellor has championed the reformulation-oriented 
“sugar tax” in 2016,24 or in the way Philadelphia’s mayor has 
advocated for the adoption of a revenue-oriented soda tax by 
the city council in 2015-2016.17,18 
At the opposite, several factors may contribute to impair 
the prospect of health-related food taxes. As Roache and 
Gostin mention, the industry is generally opposed to tax 
proposals.1 With important resources and various means 
(eg, communication campaigns, advocacy by front groups, 
lobbying), manufacturers often denounce eg, the risk that 
such taxes may bring on the local economy and jobs, their 
discriminatory nature when focused on particular products, 
their ineffectiveness to address public health issues (obesity in 
particular), their regressive nature, the threat they bring about 
consumer autonomy, or the administrative burden they may 
generate. Such opposition has been reported eg, in Denmark,25 
in the United States at the federal level,18 the state level (eg, 
in New York,26 Hawai’i23) or the local level (eg, in several 
Californian cities18,22), in Mexico12 or in South Africa.27 It has 
also been reported in the United Kingdom,24 although the 
graduated tax scheme finally adopted may not be worse for the 
beverage industry than a flat rate targeting equally all sugary 
drinks, since it may actually further stimulate reformulation 
efforts undertaken to meet consumer expectations.28,29 
Additionally, the lack of political will, majority or consensus 
to support a tax proposal may be a barrier to the emergence of 
a tax on the political agenda, its formulation or its adoption. 
For example, it appears to have been the case in Australia,6 
Canada,7 Colombia,8 Luxembourg30 as well as in several US 
states (eg, in Kansas16 and Hawai’i23). Multiple factors may 
be related to such unfavourable context, including political 
reluctance and opposition, adverse economic circumstances, 
lobbying, lack of local evidence, untimely legislative calendar, 
legal and administrative constraints, etc.13,16,21,23,25 Such factors 
are frequently covered in the media, but disentangling their 
respective contribution to the policy process is not obvious.16 
Finally, the uncertain acceptance of soda taxes among the 
population may preclude their adoption, especially where it 
is subject to a local ballot.18 Indeed, surveys tend to indicate 
that health-related food taxes are not popular in comparison 
to other nutrition policies.2 Earmarking tax proceeds to 
health promotion or social programmes targeting the most 
vulnerable population groups may boost favourable opinions, 
but may also go with political, legal or administrative 
constraints.12,14,15,18
Therefore, research on soda tax policy processes can unveil 
a myriad of influences depending on circumstances, ideas 
and interests. This is congruent with the lessons of a recent 
literature review on nutrition policy change.31 Nonetheless, 
over time, identifying critical factors among others may be 
complex and “elusive.”32 This is an area where research at 
the crossroads of public health and political science can be 
fruitful.33 
Benefit of Theory-Driven Research on Soda Tax Policy 
Processes
The use of political science theories to better understand 
health promotion issues and influence policy change appears 
promising.32 Any theory remains refutable, but as Breton 
and de Leeuw put it,34 theories of the policy process “(…) 
formulate propositions on the conditions under which 
certain policy phenomena (eg, preferences for certain types of 
interventions, decisions on implementation issues, allocation 
of resources, inclusion or exclusion of certain stakeholders, 
etc) are observed and have an impact on policy outcomes.” 
In other words, beyond common sense and intuition, 
appropriate theoretical notions can provide the researcher 
some keys to understand successful or unsuccessful stories. 
In the aforementioned literature, theory-driven research on 
soda taxation policy processes remains scarce but instructive 
cases exist. For example, Thow and colleagues’ case studies in 
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the Pacific14 refer to Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) to analyse how external events (eg, alarming chronic 
disease prevalence, budgetary shortcomings), well-established 
tax schemes as well as the interplay of health, finance and 
other authorities have jointly contributed to justify soft drink 
taxes despite industry opposition and structural constraints 
(eg, trade agreements). As a well-known and largely used 
theory, it is noteworthy that the ACF also provides insightful 
analyses of tobacco tax policy change.35 Another example of 
theory-driven research is Mosier’s multiple case study on soda 
taxation proposals in Kansas and Colorado in 2009-2010.16 
It illuminates the propensity of Kingdon’s multiple streams 
theory (MST) to explain how the random conjunction of a 
severe problem (ie, chronic public deficit), available solutions 
(ie, a package of measures including a revenue-oriented soda 
tax based on existing mechanisms) and favourable political 
circumstances (ie, sufficient consensus about a policy already 
proposed in the past) can lead policy entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of a policy window to put a soda tax on the agenda 
and make it adopted. Alongside the ACF and other theories, 
the MST has been particularly used and recommended to 
further document obesity prevention policy processes.36 
Conclusion
While the “momentum” described by Roache and Gostin1 
is growing in favor of soda taxation across the world, policy 
studies grounded in a theoretical framework of social change 
may contribute to further illuminate what conditions favor the 
relevancy of a soda tax proposal, its feasibility, its acceptability 
as well as its proper implementation and evaluation in the 
long term.
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